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Abstract . Conservativity in generalized quantifiers is linked to pre­
supposition filtering, under a propositions-as-types analysis extended 
with dependent quantifiers . That analysis is underpinned by model­
theoretically interpretable proofs which inhabit propositions they prove, 
thereby providing objects for quantification and hooks for anaphora. 
1 .  Introduction 
A binary relation D on sets is conservative if for all sets A and B, D relates 
A to B precisely if it relates A to their intersection , A n  B (Keenan and Stavi 
1986) . 
( 1 )  D (A , B) iff  D (A , A n B) 
Widely assumed to  hold for denotations of  natural language determiners , con­
servativity is demonstrably true of some and a l l . 
(2) a. some(A, B) iff A n  B =I (/) 
b.  Some ants bite iff some ants are ants that bite. 
(3) a .  a l l (A,  B) iff A � B 
b .  All ants bite iff all ants are ants that bite . 
In an extensional setting with exactly one world w,  relative to which a true 
proposition is reduced to {w} and a false proposition to (/) (these being the sets 
of worlds in which the respective propositions are true) , the equivalences (2a) 
and (3a) characterize conjunction 1\ and material implication :J ,  respectively. 
That is , some corresponds to 1\ ,  and a l l  to :J .  These correspondences are not 
only preserved but arguably take on greater significance if a proposition is iden­
tified (instead) with the set of its proofs (rather than verifying worlds) , under 
the propositions-as-types paradigm, l  reviewed below.  Such an identification 
provides an explanation not only for conservativity but also presupposition 
filtering in conjunction and implication, illustrated by (4) and (5 ) . 2  
(4) Buganda has a king and the king of Buganda is bald. 
(5) If Buganda has a king, the king of Buganda is bald . 
That explanation is essentially the admittance account of Karttunen 1974, 
centered around the picture 'f  I> A' of a context r satisfying the presupposi­
tions of a sentence A. Generalizing A 1\ B, A :J B and D (A,  B) to dependent 
quantifiers (Qx : A)B equipped with a variable x to track dependencies on A, 
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we can capture sequentiality in context growth by the equivalence (6) , where 
(as in propositions-as-types) a context f is a sequence of variable: type declara­
tions , and ' f ,  x :  A'  is the context obtained by appending to f the declaration 
'x : A' that the variable x has type A. 
(6) f I> (Qx : A)B iff f I> A and f, x : A  I> B 
The present work applies (6) to explain not only presupposition filtering in (4) 
and (5) but also the conservativity of determiners , ( 1 ) .  
Inasmuch as admittance I> is a prima facie pragmatic notion, and Heim 
1983 is lauded for deriving presupposition facts semantically, it may seem 
a curious twist to trace conservativity (surely a semantic property) to the 
'pragmatic' condition (6) . Twisted or not , it should be pointed out that 
(i) presupposition projection in (5) is, up to a point , independent of the 
precise semantic interpretation of if , be that material implication or 
some other conditional involving quantification, and 
(ii) whether or not (6) is deemed 'pragmatic ' ,  (6) can be understood within 
a perfectly respectable and rigorous logical system. 
Moreover, that logical system offers a natural setting for combining quantifi­
cation with anaphora. An obstacle facing any system that accounts for (1 ) , 
(4) and (5) is that in ( 1 ) , A and B range over sets of objects (e .g . denota­
tions of common nouns) , whereas to apply (6) to (4) and (5) , A and B must 
denote propositions (relative to suitable contexts) . For a uniform analysis un­
der (6) , the key is to treat proofs on a par with objects (in accordance with 
propositions-as-types) whilst embedding objects witnessing existential claims 
into proofs (following intuitionistic/constructive prescriptions) which can then 
be quantified selectively. The upshot is an account of adverbial quantification 
that is immune from the proportion problem , supporting existential as well 
as universal donkey readings . (The terminology here is as in, for example, 
Chierchia 1995 . )  
In  fact , the account has much in  common with Discourse Represen­
tation Theory , DRT, which in its later (non-classical) versions (from Kamp 
and Reyle 1993 on) allow for asymmetric quantification , E-type treatments 
of plural anaphora, and (in principle) existential donkeys alongside (classical) 
universal ones . What is distinctive about the present proposal (and behind 
its novel anaphoric take on conservativity) is its marriage of a model-theoretic 
conception of generalized quantification with a proof-theoretic approach to 
anaphora. That marriage rests on the understanding that - crudely put as a 
slogan -
objects are for quantification, and proofs for anaphora. 
The role of proofs in anaphora has been argued at length in , for example, 
173  
174 Tim Fernando 
Ranta 1994 (following Sundholm 1986) and Krahmer and Piwek 1999 (boost­
ing the slogan in van der Sandt 1992 to "Presupposition projection as proof 
construction" with an eye to bridging and other inferences) .  To establish 
anaphoric dependencies , the usual model-theoretic account of quantification 
must be adjusted slightly, with conservativity falling out as a consequence. 
1 . 1 .  Outline of paper 
At the center of the present work is the notion of a dependent quantifier, writ­
ten (Qx : A)B in (6) above. Roughly put , a dependent quantifier is a gener­
alized quantifier with conservativity and anaphora built in proof-theoretically. 
Section 2 focuses on dependencies , reviewing how these are introduced into 
Cartesian products and function spaces for proof-theoretic interpretations of 
/\/3 and -:J/Y respectively, and then relating these to the familiar set-theoretic 
equivalences (2a) and (3a) . Section 3 turns to finer points about quantification, 
refining case quantification in Lewis 1975 to admit more sophisticated notions 
of eventuality. After a brief look at existential vs universal donkeys and at 
conservativity, the paper closes in section 4 with an even briefer discussion of 
the proof-theoretic shift advocated and the broader notion of conservativity 
at stake. 
1 . 2 .  So why read on ? 
The formal details below are likely to try the patience of an empirically minded 
linguist , who may well ask what consequences the combination proposed of 
models with proofs has for semantic theory. One simple consequence is that 
in a sentence such as some ants bite , the verb phrase bite is interpreted as a 
proposition, relative to a context with a variable ranging over ants. From this 
interpretation , the set of ants that bite can be extracted ; but beyond that , 
there are proofs that these ants bite, on which notions of eventuality can be 
based . Under this refined semantics for verb phrases , the intersection A n  B in 
conservativity ( 1 ) i s  re-analyzed in (6) as the subset {x : A lB} of A satisfying 
B, where B is treated as a proposition relative to a context containing the 
typing x :  A. (Indeed , {x : A lB} is arguably closer to the gloss "ants that bite" 
in (2b) than A n  B, the corresponding phrase for which , "are ants and bite," 
is somewhat stilted . )  Determiners can still be viewed as relations between 
sets ; the difference lies rather in how the relevant sets are formed, the claim 
being that conservativity is a consequence of the context change underlying set 
formation , as well as presupposition satisfaction . Traditional formulations of 
semantic interpretation and of presupposition projection abstract away context 
dependence, which (6) , in part , restores . The remainder of this paper is meant 
for the reader intrigued, albeit perhaps puzzled, by this quick sketch . 
2 .  Dependencies 
According to propositions-as-types, a proposition is the collection (or type) of 
CONSERVATIVE GENERALIZED QUANTIFIERS AND PRESUPPOSITION 
its proofs .  To explain what its proofs are, it will be useful, for our purposes, to 
consider propositions alongside sets of objects (as they appear in the classical 
set-theoretic conception of generalized quantifiers) , the idea being that 
object proof 
� 
set proposition 
Objects and proofs combine to witness existential propositions, which can be 
employed to interpret indefinites , as in (7) . 
(7) a. An aardvark belched .  
b .  (:3x :  aardvark) belched (x) 
(7a) translates quite naturally to the existential proposition (7b) , a proof of 
which is a pair (a, p) consisting of an aardvark a, and a proof p of belched (a) . 
That is , equating a proposition with its collection of proofs ,  
(:3x : aardvark) belched (x) = { (a, p) I a :  aardvark and p : be lched (a)} . 
The colon : can be read as ordinary set membership when applied to sets such 
as aardvark , but is more intuitively read as proves when applied to propositions 
such as belched (a) . The variable x in the expression belched (x) marks, in a 
pair (a, p) proving (7b) , the dependence of p on a (Le . ,  the choice of p from 
belched (a) ) .  This dependence is a crucial innovation over ordinary Cartesian 
products 
A x B  = { (a, b) l a : A and b : B} , 
the pairs (a, b) in which are assembled from independent components a and 
b. Part of the picture (6) of dependent quantifiers is the mediation of de­
pendencies through a variable x, subject to a mechanism of context r and 
context growth (illustrated in (6) by the step to r, x :  A) . §2 . 1  reviews how 
that is achieved proof-theoretically, while §2 .2  takes up the question of model­
theoretic interpretation . 
2 . 1 .  Proof-theoretic intuitions 
Let us henceforth use the word type for a set , such as aardvark ,  or a proposition 
such as belched (a) . Generalizing from aardvark to A and belched (x) to B, and 
turning :3 into � (for reasons that will become clear shortly) , we get (8) , where 
B[x/a] is B with x replaced by a.3 
(8) (�x : A)B = { (a, b) I a : A  and b : B [x/a] } 
a. Call the left projection l ,  so l (a, b) = a. 
b .  Call the right projection r ,  so r (a, b) = b. 
Notice that the cross x in the Cartesian product A x B is transformed into a 
variable x in (�x : A)B,  which is often referred to as a dependent product .  The 
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notation :E as well as its use to interpret :3 (commonly construed semantically 
as a union) also suggest the label "dependent sum" - which can be confusing, 
as we will apply :E to conjunction , not disjunction. 
Passing to multi-sentential discourse, consider (9a) and the challenge 
of translating the occurrence in the second sentence of the pronoun it . 
(9) a .  An aardvark belched . It was in distress . 
b .  (:Ez : (:Ex : aardvark) belched (x) ) was- i n-d istress (lz) 
(9b) translates (9a) by taking a proof z of the translation (7b) of (7a) , and 
projecting its left component (named lz according to (8a) ) to anaphorically 
bind it .  The proof z is hypothetical inasmuch as it is a variable bound by 
:E, the intuition behind (9) being that in order to interpret it (at least , under 
its anaphoric reading) , we had better be prepared to take (7) for granted . 
(Readers familiar with DRT and/or related formalisms may complain that a 
translation of it into the term lz involves a bit more work than one into the 
variable x.  Maybe so. But it should come as no surprise that in practice , that 
discrepancy is purely notational and easily resolvable.4 ) . 
Changing (9a) to an implication, consider ( lOa) , the translation of 
which, ( lOb) , appeals to the construct IT, characterized in ( 1 1 ) .  
( 10) a. If an aardvark belched it was in distress. 
b. (ITz : (:Ex : aardvark) belched (x) ) was- i n-distress (lz) 
( 1 1 )  (ITx : A)B = {functions mapping a : A  t o  b : B [x/a] } 
Assuming x is a dummy variable (occurring in neither A nor B ) , the dependent 
function space (ITx : A)B reduces to the usual function space A -+ B, just as 
(:Ex : A)B reduces to A x B.  In ( lOb) , however, the dependence mediated by 
the variable z bound by IT is indispensable in linking an aardvark that belched 
with a proof that it was in distress . A function proving ( l Ob) witnesses the 
claim in ( lOa) that every aardvark that belched was in distress , j ust as a pair 
proving (9b) witnesses (9a) . Repeating the move from :E to IT, we step from 
(7) to ( 12) . 
(1 2 ) a. 
b. 
Every aardvark belched . 
(ITx : aardvark) belched (x) 
Together (7) , (9) , ( 10) and ( 1 2) illustrate how to express the usual predicate 
logic constructs :3, A and 'ii, :J in terms of :E and IT.  
force 
:E IT 
set :3 'iI 
proposition A :J 
restrictor A 
(:3/'ilx : A)B = (:E/ITx : A)B 
A A/:J B = (:E/IT_ : A)B 
where _ is a dummy variable 
CONSERVATIVE GENERALIZED QUANTIFIERS AND PRESUPPOSITION 
The constructs 3, A, 'V and :J are understood here in the abstract sense they 
are used in symbolic logic , and, as such , do not fully account for how their 
English counterparts are used . For example, (9a) can hardly be paraphrased 
as (9c) , a better paraphrase being (9d) . 
(9) c. ? An aardvark belched, and it was in distress . 
d .  An aardvark belched, as it was in distress . 
It is enough, for our present purposes , however, that A/'E capture part of 
what's going on in (9ad) , and that that part explain the presupposition filtering 
in (4) . Similarly for :JIll and (5) . 
Now that we have a feel for 'E and II,  let us inquire more closely into 
the notion of dependence at work. If the variable x in ('Ex : A)B or (IIx : A)B 
is to mediate non-vacuous dependence, it must occur in B.  This raises the 
question: just what is (say) an expression belched (x) with a variable x? As 
an expression,  belched (x) expresses a type only in a context where x has an 
appropriate type .  Which leads to the next question : what is a context? A 
context r is a finite sequence of variable typings , on the basis of which variables 
and more complicated terms such as lz can be typed. Examples are provided 
by ( 13a) and ( 13b) , where a sequent f * t :  A can be read "t has type A in 
the context f" or "f supports the typing t :  A." 
( 13) a. x :  aardvark * x :  aardvark 
b. z :  ('Ex : aardvark) belched (x) * lz : aa rdvark 
c. 
f * t :  aardvark 
f t> belched (t) 
d. 
f * t :  aa rdvark 
r t> was- i n-d istress (t) 
( 13a) is an example of the simplest way to use an assumption (Le . ,  as a con­
clusion) ,  while ( 13b) is suggested by our understanding (8) of 'E. ( 13c) and 
( 13d) are rules for inferring a sequent at the bottom (the denominator of, as it 
were, the fraction) , given sequents at the top (the numerator) . The sequents 
f t> A at the bottom of ( 13c) and (13d) can be read "A expresses a propo­
sition in the . context of f" or, as mentioned in the introduction, "f satisfies 
the presuppositions of A," shortened in Karttunen 1974 to "f admits A." 5 We 
will justify ( 13c) and ( 13d) in §2 . 2 ;  for now, note that ( 13a) and ( 13c) yield 
( 14) , while ( 13b) and (13d) yield ( 15) . 
(14) x :  aardvark t> belched (x) 
( 15 )  z : ('Ex : aardvark) belched (x) t> was- i n-distress ( lz) 
To relate ( 14) and (15) to presupposition satisfaction for (7b) , ( 12b) , (9b) and 
(lOb) , it is helpful to introduce a further form of assertion, A type,  saying 
that A is a well-defined collection. A concrete example is ( 16a) ; more general 
uses are made in ( 16b) , which characterizes presupposition satisfaction of 'E 
and II, and ( 16c) , which takes sequents f * A type to be generalizations of 
f t> A (as A is, on this assumption, the collection of its proofs) . 6 
( 16)  a. € * aardvark type (where € i s  the empty sequence) 
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r =} A type r, x : A  I> B 
r I> (Ex : A)B 
r l> A  
r =} A type 
r =} A type r, x : A I> B 
r I> (IIx : A)B 
Henceforth , we suppress the empty sequence c when it occurs to the left of =} 
or 1> ,  and write, for instance, =} aardvark type for ( 16a) . Instantiating the 
premisses of ( 16b) by (16a) and (14) , we get I> (7b) and I> ( 1 2b) (dropping c) . 
I> (7b) and (16c) then give =} (7b) type, which together with ( 15) and ( I6b) 
yield I> (9b) and I> ( lOb) . 
Before moving on, let us pause to consider a slight variant of (9) , re­
placing the pronoun it in (9a) by a definite description. 
( 17) a. An aardvark belched, The aardvark was in distress . 
'-- --... ' v ' 
b .  
c .  
(Ez : (7b) ) 
z :  (7b) 
{lz : aa rdvark} was- in-d istress ( lz) 
I> {lz : aa rdvark} was- in-distress (lz) 
( 17b) differs from (9b) only in introducing an expression {lz : a ardvark} for 
the definite description in (17a) . Assuming ( 17c) , we can derive I> ( 1 7b) from 
1> (7b) and (16b) . But how do we get ( 17c) ? ( 1 7c) follows from ( 13b) , ( 1 5 )  
and the general rule7 
r =} t : A  r l> B  
r l>  {t : A}B 
If (9) has the variant ( 17) ,  ( 10) has the variant (18) . 
(18)  a. If  an aardvark belched the aardvark was in distress 
" Y' I "  v ., 
b. (IIz : (7b) ) {lz : aa rdvark} was- i n-d istress ( lz) 
Comparing {t : A}B with (Ex : A)B,  we have in t vs x the familiar vs novel 
opposition in Heim 1982 between definites and indefinites . A question we have 
been ignoring since discussing (9) re-emerges : where does lz in (9b) , ( lOb) , 
( 17b) or ( I8b) come from? Recognizing the need for a process to pick out lz ,  
let us introduce a meta-variable v in the translation (19b) of ( 19a) and ( 19d) 
of ( 19c) , the idea being that anaphora resolution turns v into lz .  
( 19) a. It was in distress . 
b .  was- in-d istress (v) 
c. The aardvark was in distress. 
d .  {v :aardvark} was- i n-distress (v) 
( 19a/c) may, of course, occur within a discourse where v cannot be resolved 
to a term, or where v can be resolved to more than one term. This raises very 
interesting complications, which we pass over in silence.s 
2 . 2 .  Formal implementation 
Next , we construe =} and I> formally, relative to a relational signature L 
specifying relation symbols with arities . The arity of a relation symbol R is 
the number of arguments R takes , each of which is understood (for simplicity) 
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to have the same sort U .  U can be equated with Montague's entity type e ,  
and would , under Tarskian semantics , get interpreted by an L-model M as the 
universe U M over which first-order quantification ranges , with n-ary L-relation 
symbols R interpreted as n-ary relations RM � UMn on UM .  Having drawn 
the distinction between expressions and denotations, we will often shorten 
"relation symbol" to "relation ," as in the description (20) of a particular choice 
of L to account for the examples in §2 . 1 .  
(20) a. U is a type, =? L U type 
b. belched , was- i n-d istress and aavk are unary L-relations 
r =?L t : U  r =?L t : U  
r I>L  belched (t) r I>L was- i n-distress (t) 
r =?L t : U  
r I> L  aavk (t) 
Returning to (7) , repeated below as (21ab) , (20ab) combine with the rules 
( 16bc) to give I>L (21c) . 9  
(21)  a .  
b. 
c. 
An aardvark belched . d .  
(Ex : aa rdvark) belched (x) 
(Ex : U) (E_ : aavk(x ) ) belched (x) 
, , .... 
aavk( x) !\ belched (x) 
3x (aavk(x)!\belched (x) ) 
x 
e .  aavk (x) 
belched (x) 
(21c) translates to the first-order formula (21d) and in DRT to (21e) . Expres­
sions such as (2 1b) containing aardvark can, as we will see presently, be formed 
from subtypes {x : A IB} ,  where 
{x : A lB} is read "the set of x's in A satisfying B" . 
More precisely, we take {x : A IB}  to abbreviate l [ (Ex : A)B] , where 1 is the left 
projection described in (8) , and lifted to types in (22) . 10 
(22) a. l [C] is the image {le I e : C} of C under 1 
r =?L C type 
r =?L l [C] type 
b. {x : A lB}  is a subset of A 
r =?L t : C 
r =?L It : l [C] 
r, x : A  =?L B type . r -----:-----,.---- y not III 
r, y : {x : A IB} =?L y : A  
Thus, if aa'rdvark is literally the subtype {x : U I aavk(x) } ,  then (22b) gives 
x :  aardvark =?L x : U , which couples with (20) to produce ( 13cd) . In general , a 
unary relation P induces the subtype {x : U  I P(x) } .  
Now, let us compare the characterizations (8) and ( 1 1 )  of E and II 
with the classical accounts (2a) and (3a) of some and a l l . Recalling that ,  
under propositions-as-types , a proposition A i s  true exactly if  it  is  non-empty 
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( i .e . , it has a proof) , observe that 
(�x : A)B is true i,ff 
(IIx : A)B is true i,ff 
A n B =I= 0  
A � B  . 
Indeed, it is not even clear how to understand the right hand sides above , with 
the variable x missing. (22) provides the ingredients for fixing the equivalences : 
add x to the right hand sides , as in (23) . 
(23) a. {�x : A)B is true iff A n  {x : A lB} =1= 0 
b. (IIx : A)B is true iff A � {x : A IB} 
But just what are we to make of the equivalences in (23)?  Let us start 
by restoring the distinction between expressions and denotations . In order 
to interpret say, (�x : aardvark) belched {x) as a collection of ordered pairs (in 
accordance with (8) ) ,  let us define an L-proof-interpretation [ . ] to specify a 
set [U] and for every n-ary L-relation symbol R and (al . . .  an ) E [u]n , a set 
[R, al . . .  an] of what we will regard as proofs of R{al . . .  an ) .  (The use here 
of E reflects the assumption that our meta-theory is some classical set theory, 
as is customary in model theory. 11 ) Exactly what the elements of [R,  al . . .  an] 
are need not concern us any more than how to choose an L-model , any of 
which, M, induces an L-proof-interpretation P{M) = U with [U] = UM and 
if RM {al . . .  an ) 
otherwise . 
Conversely, an L-proof-interpretation U reduces to the L-model M [·] = M 
where U M = [U] and 
RM = { (al . . .  an ) E [Ur I [R, al . . .  an] =1= 0} . 
Clearly, M {P {M))  = M although it is not always the case that P{M [·] )  = 
[l Be that as it may, the point is that an L-interpretation provides the basis 
for an interpretation [ ·h of first-order formulas , with, for instance, 
[V'x . (P(x) :) 3y .R{x , Y) )h = (IIx :  [U]) (II_ : [P, x] ) {�y :  [U] ) [R,  x , y] 
or, for the reader familiar with DRT, an interpretation [ ·h , with 
[ I P(x) I =? I P(x) I h = (IIz : (Ex :. [UJ ) [P, xJ ) [P, lz] . 
These interpretations can be obtained from translations "-+1 , "-+2 to dependent 
type expressions over L 
V'x. {P{x) :) 3y.R{x , y) ) "-+1 (IIx : U) {II_ : P{x ) ) (�y : U )R{x , y) 
I P(x) I =} I P{x) I "-+2 (IIz : {�x : U)P{x) )  P{lz) 
which are then fed into an interpretation U' with 
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[ (fIx :  U) (IL : P(x) ) (Ey : U)R(x, y)] ' = (fIx :  [U] ) (fI_ : [P, x] ) (Ey : [U] ) [R, x , y] 
[(IIz : (Ex : U)P(x) )P(lz) ] ' = (IIz : (Ex : [U] ) [P, x] ) [P, lz] . 
That any L-proof-interpretation (from set theory) can be extended to inter­
pret dependent types is clear from, for instance, Feferman 1975 . (Details in 
Fernando 200 1 . )  Returning to (23) , the claim made there is that 
[ (Ex : A)B]' =F 0 iff [A] ' n [{x : A IBH' =F 0 
[ (IIx : A)B]' =F 0 iff [A] ' � [(x : A IBH' 
for every L-proof-interpretation [ - ] , extended canonically to U' .  
SO what? What do we gain by piling a layer of language on to (23) ? The 
pay-off lies in the possibility of expanding L with generalized quantifiers along 
the same lines as in the weak logic L(Q) of Keisler 1970 , where an L-model M 
is paired with a set-theoretic interpretation of a generalized quantifier symbol 
Q to form an L (Q) - model . Keisler exploits the variety in L (Q)-models to 
prove a completeness theorem for L(Q) , providing the basis for an axiomatic 
approach to Q. Now, turning to dependent types, the idea is to expand an L­
proof-interpretation H to Q, by equipping H with a relational interpretation 
Qn much like any binary L-relation R is interpreted, except that the arguments 
of Qr are subtypes of [Ul In fact , we will extend these arguments in section 
3. But that can wait . The point to appreciate now is that (23) is positive 
evidence for the feasibility of the whole enterprise, establishing, as it does , 
the compatibility of dependent type interpretations of Q = :3 and Q = V 
with relational interpretations . Having noted the usefulness of the notions of 
a signature L and an L-proof-interpretation [ 'J , we need not always mention 
them. Accordingly, when the choice of L and/or U does not matter, we will 
drop them (stripping, for instance, L from =9L/r>L ,  and [] from [AD . 
Getting down to details , how should a (binary) quantifier symbol Q 
feed into the dependent type expressions described above? On the assumption 
that smooth generalizations of E and II are desirable, recall our rule ( 16b) for 
E and II, repeat"ed below. 
( 16) 
r =9 A type r, x : A  r> B 
b. 
r r> (Ex : A)B 
r =9 A type r , x : A  r> B 
r r> (IIx : A)B 
( 16b) is not quite in line with Karttunen's admittance account , formulated in 
the introduction as (6) . 
(6) r r> (Qx : A)B iff r r> A and r, x : A  r> B 
The sequent r r> A in (6) is weakened in ( 16b) to the premiss r =9 A type.  To 
say that A is a well-defined collection in r,  r =9 A type,  falls short of saying 
that A makes a claim in r, r r> A. A concrete example is the derivation 
of r> (Ex : U ) a avk(x) [i .e . , :3x aavk (x) ]  from =9 U type and x :  U r> aavk (x) , 
leading (with the help of (16c) and (22a) ) to =9 {x : U l aavk (x) } type. In 
ordinary predicate logic, neither U nor {x : U l aavk (x) } would qualify as a for-
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mula. A slightly different example , moving to verbal predicates , comes back 
to a point made in § 1 . 2 .  The verb bite in some ants bite ought not to be 
interpreted too quickly as the set B of biters , as in (2) , but rather as an · 
expression bite (x) , the presuppositions of which are satisfied by any context r 
that supports the typing x :  U .  There is a variable x here worth recognizing 
before abstracting away. Behind the scenes lurk proofs E [bite ,  a] for a E 
[U] such that a bites in H - proofs that get discarded when forming {x : 
U l bite (x) } . 
As for (6) versus ( 16b) , we will , nevertheless , see next a sense in which 
(6) will do for generalized quantifiers Q that more closely model English . 
3 .  Quantification 
In section 2, dependent types were employed to endow first-order formulas 
with anaphoric power. That said , whenever possible, let us adopt suggestive 
notation, writing /\ or :3 instead of E,  and ::> or V instead of II.  As hinted at 
the end of §2 . 2 ,  it will be useful to refine :3 and V to model English sentences . 
An example is (24a) , the translation (24b) of which can be pretty-printed as 
the DRT duplex condition (24c) P 
(24) a. Every boy with a nice suit will wear it tomorrow. 
b .  (Every z : C)D where C is :3x:3y (boy (x) /\ n ice-su it (y) /\ 
with (x, y) ) , and D is wi l l-wear-tomorrow ( lz , l (rz) ) .  
c .  
x, y 
boy(x) 
nice-suit (y) 
with (x, y) 
wil l-wear-tomorrow (x , y) 
(24a) brings out a well-known complication (e .g . Kamp and Reyle 1993 , Chier­
chia 1995) j every binds boy without universally quantifying suits. Lest we 
assert that every nice suit owned by a boy be worn tomorrow, we had better 
not equate (24b) with (IIz : C)D. To pick out the quantified variable x (inside 
the diamond in (24c) ) ,  let us apply the left projection lj by (22) , 
' 
I [C] = {x :  boy I (:3y : n ice-suit) with (x, y) }  
1 [{z : C ID}] = {x : boy I (:3y : n ice-su i t) (with (x, y) /\ wi l l-wear-tomorrow (x , y) ) }  
where (extensional equivalence) = holds between types that have the same 
objects, and P = {x : U I P (x) } for unary relations P. This leads to (25a) , 
modifying the picture of a l l  in (23b) (which , in turn , amends (3a) ) .  
(25) a. (Every z : C)D iff I [C] � l [{z : C ID}] 
b.  (Qz : A)B iff Qr (l [A] , l [{z : A IB}] ) 
(25b) generalizes (25a) to a quantifier Q with a binary relation Qr which , 
under the set-theoretic conception of Q (in ( 1 ) , (2 )  and (3) ) ,  interprets Q.  In 
the present set-up , an equivalence 'T iff 8' between types T and 8 (as in 
(25ab) ) means ' [T] -I- 0 iff [8] -I- 0 for all interpretations H '  (see §2 .2 ) . A full-
CONSERVATIVE GENERALIZED QUANTIFIERS AND PRESUPPOSITION 
er characterization of (Qz : A)B as a type (of proofs) is given in (26) , from 
which (25b) follows . 
(26) (Qz : A)B = { (�z : A)B} x Qr (l [A] , l [{z : A IB}] ) 
According to (26) , (Qz : A)B is a second-order product, an element of which 
is a pair ( (�z : A)B, t) of (�z : A)B and a proof t of Qr (l [A] , l [{ z : A lB}] ) .  
Forming pairs with (�z : A)B has anaphoric applications similar to DRT. 
(27b) is a distributive reading of the sentence they will get mud on it  in the 
two-sentence discourse (27a) , the first sentence in which is (24a) , every boy 
with a nice suit will wear it tomorrow.  
(27) a. Every boy . . .  tomorrow. They will get mud on it. , ' v 
(24a) lu where u :  (24b) 
� 
b. (I1z : (�x : C)D) wi l l-get-mud-on (l (lz) ,  l (r (lz) ) )  
c .  (�u : (24b) ) (I1z : lu) wi l l-get-mud-on (l (lz) ,  l (r (lz) ) )  
(27c) is a reading of (27a) that exploits equation (26) . Unfortunately, we do  not 
. have the space to discuss (26) further - beyond,  that is , the truth equivalence 
(25b) , which we will explore alongside the formation rule (6) '  capturing the 
Karttunen admittance condition (6) . 
(6) '  
r !> A  r , z : A !> B  
r !> (Qz : A)B 
§3 . 1 examines the selectivity in quantification effected by left projection l over 
the unselective binding in (23) . §3 .2  takes up refinements that allow so-called 
strong/V readings (within a selective quantification approach) and possibly a 
smoother syntax/semantics interface for English than (6) ' . §3 .3  turns finally 
to conservativity. 
3 . 1 .  From unselective binding to constructive eventualities 
First , let us note how to recover unselectivity (23) from l-selectivity (25b) . 
Passing from A to (�_ : A)T for some fresh variable _ distinct from x and for 
some tautology T (i . e . ,  an expression such that !> T and ::::} t :  T for some term 
t) , we have 
(IIx : A)B iff (Every x : (�_ : A)T)B [x/lxl 
(and similarly for �/Some) . By contrast , expressing (25a) unselectively is 
complicated by the anaphoric link between a nice suit and it . 
That � and II, and hence the propositional connectives 1\ and ::::> , can 
be viewed as unselective quantifiers raises the question: what about the ap­
plication in Lewis 1975 of unselective quantifiers to adverbs of quantification? 
An example is (28) , the idea being that 
Our adverbs are quantifiers over cases; a case may be regarded as 
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the 'tuple of its participants; and these participants are the values 
of the variables that occur free in the open sentence modified by 
the adverb. [Lewis 1975 , p .7] 
(28) Northerners seldom recognize southerners . 
'Few pairs of northerners n and southerners s are such that n 
recognizes s . ' 
After outlining a simple theory of case quantification, Lewis concedes that 
matters are not quite that simple . . . , adverbs of quantification are 
not entirely unselective . . .  we might prefer to treat the modified 
sentence as if it contained an event-variable (or even posit such a 
variable in underlying structure) and include an event-coordinate 
in the cases . 
. " not just any 'tuple of values of the free variables, plus perhaps 
a time- or event-coordinate, will be admissible as one of the cases 
quantified over . Various restrictions may be in force . . .  [p .8] 
The remainder of §3 . 1 is an attempt to work out these ideas in the present 
set-up. 
We start by building up Lewis ' admissible tuples to generalized quan­
tificational domains (gqd 's) , focusing on the special case (29d) of the admit­
tance/formation rule (6) ' , 13 
(29) a. r => U gqd for every context r 
b.  
r => T gqd r, x : T  => T' gqd 
r => (::Ix : T)T' gqd 
c .  
r => T gqd 
r => T type 
d .  
r => T gqd r, x : T  I> A r, z : (::Ix : T)A  I> B 
r I> (Qz : (::Ix : T)A)B 
(29ab) throws U in among the gqd's, and closes them under tupling. (29c) 
says gqd's are types . In accordance with the intuition that r => T gqd should 
not be confiated with r I> T, we write ::I in (29bd) for E .  To allow for 
dependencies which might become useful if further closure conditions on gqd 's 
are introduced, we stop short in (29b) of writing Cartesian multiplication x .  
For the present , however, ::I in (29b) can be simplified to x .  For example, (28) 
above translates to (30) . 
(30) (Few z : (::Ix : (U  x U)A» recognize (l (lz) , r (lz» where A is 
northerner( Ix) !\southerner( rx) . 
The gloss in (28) can then be recovered by applying (25b) to (30) . Identifying 
Lewis ' admissibility conditions with A in (29d) and (30) , notice that (29) goes 
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beyond Lewis 1975 in allowing A to quantify some objects away from the 
quantificational force of Q/few. 
case 
--------. 
(3 x : ( U  x U) )  R(lx, rx) unselective/Lewis - e.g .  (28) 
selective/nominal (3x : U)  (3y : U)R(x, y) 
, � 
admissibility condition A 
According to many (e.g. Peters and Westerstahl (to appear) ) ,  the latter se­
lective reading fits nominal quantifications such as Few northerners recognize 
southerners better than (28) . Clearly, we must impose suitable constraints on 
applications of (29d) , if we are to rule out a selective reading of (28) . But 
then , unselective readings are not always appropriate for adverbs either, as S ,  
Berman's sentence ( 3 1 )  shows (Dekker 1997) . 
(31)  If  a letter arrives for me,  I am usually at home. 
'For most times a letter arrives for me I am at home . '  
For (29d) to  capture (31 ) ,  the admissibility condition A must internally bind 
the letter-variable (keeping it from the reach of most) . 
Indeed, selection complications infect already simple adverbial modifi­
cations, as in (32bc) , where different sides of a proof z of the translation B of 
(32a) are selected . 
(32) a. Aldo belched � (3t : PastTime) belch (a ldo ,  t) 
b. 
c . 
, '+ 
I 
Aldo belched yesterday 
Aldo belched politely 
B 
� (�z : B) yesterday ( lz) 
� (�z : B) pol ite ( r z) 
There is no question that translations indicated in (32) by � are problems 
which cannot be solved merely by studying the logical forms � points to . 14 
Thus, while (29) can hardly be the full story, that is no reason to reject it . 
What can we say about labels such as rz in (32c) for belch (a ldo , lz)? It 
is worth quoting Troelstra and Schwichtenberg 2000. 
when are two proofs to be considered equal? We doubt . . .  this 
question will ever have a simple answer; it may well be that there 
are many answers, depending on aims and points of view. (p.xii) 
Mysterious though their identity conditions may be, proofs can nevertheless 
be studied and used. And for the present linguistic applications, I suggest that 
a proposition (3x : T)A formed from a gqd T (as in 29d) induces the following 
notion of identity on proofs: 
z = z' mod (3x : T)A iff z : (3x : T)A and z' : (3x : T)A and lz = lz '  . 
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That is, proofs z and z' of (:3x : T)A are compared based on their left projec­
tions, these being tuples of objects with presumably non-problematic identity 
conditions. Accordingly, quantification in (25b) selects left components (giv­
ing us one half of the slogan in the introduction: objects are for quantification 
and proofs for anaphora) . Precisely what the identity conditions on rz in (32c) 
are is sidestepped . 
Thrning now to Lewis' invocation of events, I propose (33) , which falls 
just short of identifying proofs with eventualities. 
(33) Constructive eventuality assumption (CEA) : associate eventu-
alities with proofs, extracting objects for quantification . 
For CEA to be a theory of eventualities, something must be said about the 
propositions (:3x : T)A defining eventuality-types, the instances of which form 
the left projection {x : T IA} .  Leaving a development of  CEA for some other 
occasion, I ought perhaps to point out that CEA is not so much an empirical 
claim as a methological assumption . It can be satisfied trivially by reifying 
eventualities into T. The intent in CEA, however, is to base notions of even­
tuality also on the right side of (3x : T)A, as hinted by (32c) . 
3 . 2 .  Some refinements 
Next , we extend (29) by (2ge) and (29f) , to consider various readings of (34) , 
analyzed at length in Kanazawa 1994b, Chierchia 1995 and Krifka 1996. 
(29) e. 
f. 
r :::} T gqd r, x : T  I> A 
r :::} {x : T IA}  gqd 
r :::} T gqd r, x : T  I> A r, x : T, y : A  I> B 
r I> (Qx : T, Q'y : A)B 
(34) Q farmer who owns a donkey beats it . 
(Qx : farmer, Q'y : (3v : donkey)owns(x, v ) )  beats (x , ly) 
Recalling that P = {x : U I P(x) } ,  (2ge) is used to apply (29f) to (34) , the 
point behind the double quantification (Qx : T, Q'y :  A)B being to separate the 
Q-quantified "farmer" variable x from the antecedent/indefinite "donkeys" in 
y , which are quantified (in the 'scope'  B) by Q'. The precise semantics is (35) . 
(35) (Qx : T, Q'y :  A)B iff Qr ( {x : T IA} , {x : T IQ'r (A, {y : A lB} ) } )  
An immediate consequence of (35) i s  (36) . 
(36) (Qx : T, :3y : A)B iff (Qz : (:3x : T)A)B [x/lz , y/rz] 
To match choices of Q' other than the weak reading :3 ,  let us build Q' into 
(25b) as shown in (37a) , which uses (37b) . 
(37) a. (QQ, z : C)D iff Qr ( l [C] , l [{z : C ID} -Q' CD 
b. C' -QI C = {z : C' I Q'r ({y l (lz , y) : C} , {y l (lz , y) : C'} ) }  
(Alternatively, one might try expressing (Qx : T, Q'y : A)B by iterations such 
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as (Qx : T) (Q'y : A)B;  good luck! ) Clearly, if C' � C then C' -3  C 
from which (38) follows. 
(38) (Qz : C)D iff (Q3z : C)D 
Also , i f  C i s  (::Ix :  T)A and D i s  B[x/lz , y/rz] , then 
{z : C ID} -Q' C = {z : C I D  /\ Q'r (A [x/lz] , {y : A [x/lzJ lB [x/lz] } ) } 
(where = is extensional equivalence) . Consequently, we have (39) . 
(39) For conservative QT ! 
(Qx : T, Q'y : A)B iff (QQ' z : (::Ix : T)A) B [x/lz , y/rz] 
To meet the assumption of conservativity in (39) , observe the following. 
(40) Given Q, define Q to have the relational interpretation 
Qr (S, S' )  iff Qr (S, S n S') . 
Then for all Q' , (QQ'x : A)B  iff (QQ,x : A)B . 
C' , 
(40) says that in an expression (QQ'x : A)B ,  we can assume without loss of 
generality that Qr is conservative (replacing, if necessary, Q by Q) . 
Having reformulated (Qx : A)B  and (Qx : T, Q'y : A)B  in terms of QQ" 
what can we say now about existential vs universal donkeys? I am not sure . 
But rather than arguing (as Kanazawa 1994b and Chierchia 1995 do) that 
some dynamic version of conservativity be met , let us apply context change to 
explain conservativity in its static splendor. To simplify notation , we revert to 
(Qx : A)B ,  leaving the refinement (QQ'x :  A)B for the hardy reader to check. 
(Q' only clutters things up . ) 
3 .3 .  Explaining conservativity 
Inasmuch as the dependent quantifier (Qx : A)B applies Qr only to pairs (S, S') 
such that S' � S ,  we can assume that Qr is conservative (appealing to Q from 
§3 .2) . But surely it is not enough to say that Qr is conservative because we 
can assume that it is . We could just as easily assume it is not ! The relation 
{ (S, S n S') I Qr (S, S') }  is not in general conservative, but (like Qr) induces a 
dependent quantifier truth-conditionally equivalent to (Qx : A)B.  The blunt 
fact is that (Qx : A)B is indifferent to what Qr makes of pairs (8, S') with 
s' g S. And to test Qr 's conservativity, we need to apply Qr to such pairs . 
Accordingly, consider (41 ) , where P is understood to be {x : U IP (x) } .  
(41 ) a. Q ants bite . 
b .  Qr (ant ,  bite) 
c .  Qr (a nt ,  {x : ant l bite (x) } ) [iff Qr (ant, a nt n bite) ] 
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(41b) represents the truth conditions of (41a) under a traditional analysis , 
whereas (41c) comes from the present dependent quantifier interpretation . We 
can now explain conservativity. 
The validity of the traditional analysis (41 b) rests on its equiva­
lence with that of dependent quantifiers (41c) . That equivalence 
is what it means for Qr to be conservative. 
The twist in this simple explanation may well be hard to take. I have tried 
to prepare the ground for it by linking (41c) to presupposition and anaphora. 
Doing so is not altogether straightforward, as the failure of (Qx : a nt) bite(x) 
to express (41c) attests . I5 
4 .  Discussion: updating Montague 
Put in very general terms, the present work is an attempt to introduce a proof­
theoretic interpretation of type theory to Montague semantics , while retaining 
model-theoretic interpretations . To connect presupposition satisfaction r [> A 
with truth, it is convenient to rewrite r [> A as r => A wff (in accordance with 
the intuition that 'A's presuppositions are satisfied by f' precisely if 'A is a 
well-formed formula under r' ) . 16 The idea then is to boost Montague's truth 
values t to wff, and to build generalized quantificational domains (gqd 's) 
from a universe U (Montague's e) , using E and l (rather than functions and 
A's ,  which are implicit in the background signature L) . Wff's and gqd 's are all 
types , and, as such , are subject to the same rules on typings t :  A ,  relative to 
a context r. That is to say, presupposition satisfaction and conservativity are 
subject to a common mechanism of context dependence/change . A context 
here is a sequence of variable-type declarations, familiar in typed functional 
programming languages . This makes the set-up attractive from a computa­
tional point of view. And, taking care to account for previous insights, perhaps 
also from a theoretical perspective .  
Tim . Fernando©t cd . i e 
Endnotes 
*Talks on the work reported here were (in its early stages) given in London, 
Amsterdam and Dublin, not to mention New York. My thanks to the audiences 
there, including Paul Dekker for generously sharing some of his unpublished 
notes on the subject . 
I "Propositions-as-types" is referred to as formulas-as-types in BPT (Thoelstra 
and Schwichtenberg ,2000) , and formulated elsewhere as the Curry-Howard 
isomorphism between a typed A-calculus and a natural deduction system. The 
names Martin-Lof and de Bruijn (not to mention Girard) are also noteworthy 
in this connection; references can be found in BPT and Ranta 1994. 
CONSERVATIVE GENERALIZED QUANTIFIERS AND PREsUPPOSITION 
2The point of both (4) and (5) is that neither presupposes Buganda has a king. 
Although, in isolation, their second clause, the king of Buganda is bald , pre­
supposes the existence of a Bugandan king, this presupposition is discharged 
by their first clause, Buganda has a king . (The presupposition that there is a 
thing called Buganda remains. )  
31 am, for the sa�e of  convenience, being a bit loose here with the distinction 
between syntactic expressions and their semantic denotations . In particular, 
the presence of the variable x in belched (x) points to the need to relativize the 
notion of a type to a context that assigns variables such as x a type. Logical 
hygiene will come later. 
40n co-indexing an anaphoric term with an antecedent x introduced by a 
dynamic existential quantifier ex, Kanazawa 1994a is careful to point out 
that "the 'binding' relation between x and ex is an indirect one mediated by 
; or =?" (page 224, footnote 10) . By combining ex with ; for Ex, and ex 
with =? for IIx (described in ( 1 1 ) ) ,  the proof-conditional approach encodes 
into its anaphoric terms the inferences required for binding - inferences that 
can be constrained or expanded as the user sees fit , by controlling term/proof 
construction . A detailed comparison between first-order fragments of dynamic 
and proof-conditional semantics is carried out in Fernando 200 l .  
5The use of the symbol I> follows Beaver 1997. 
6We would not go too far wrong were we to conflate the sequents r =? A type 
and r I> A. Until , that is ,  the distinction is  played up in section 3 . 
71 am indebted to Peter Krause (p .c . )  for suggesting this treatment of the 
presupposition connective (see Beaver 1997 for some background) . By con­
trast , in Fernando (to appear) , the construct { . }  B is analyzed before type 
evaluation, at which point the conditions · in { . } B are assumed to be satisfied 
(and erased) . The idea there is to borrow the distinction from programming 
language practice between compilation and execution, treating { . } as com­
ments checked during compilation, and ignored at run-time. The formulation 
suggested by Krause does away with this distinction . 
8The interested reader is referred to van der Sandt 1992,  Beaver 1997, and, for 
a paper linking accommodation to leaps studied in proof theory, as well as a 
modal approach to ambiguity, Fernando (to appear) . 
9To demonstrate this rigorously, it helps to have x :  U =? L  x :  U and x :  U ,  y :  
aavk(x) =?L x :  U ,  both of which follow from (20) , ( 16c) and the three rules 
€ context 
r =? A type . r =----:----'--- X not III 
r, x :  A context 
r context , A" r 
r A 
x :  In . 
=? x :  
lOSubtypes are a delicate matter in the propositions-as-types literature, the 
simple-minded treatment in (22) departing from the tenet that the type of 
an object is unique. For applications to linguistics , however, 1 am not aware 
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of any compelling reason to complicate (22) or reject the set-theoretic foun- . 
dations nearly universally taken for granted in, for instance, model-theoretic 
semantics . Given the work on generalized quantifiers in linguistics (Keenan 
and Westerstahl 1997) , surely we can be forgiven for being as conservative as 
possible in introducing useful proof-theoretic ideas to the set-theoretic concep­
tion of generalized quantifiers . In particular , as admirable as Sundholm 1989 
might be, I am inclined to build on the weak completeness theorem in Keisler 
1970 and the considerable body of work that has followed it . 
1 1  See the preceding endnote. 
12The reader unfamiliar with DRT can ignore the references to it , but may 
nevertheless find the boxes and diamonds useful for orientation . Speaking of 
which , the adequacy of (6) claimed at the end of §2 .2  is not surprising from 
the perspective of Kamp and Reyle 1993 inasmuch as the treatment there of 
quantifiers respects (6) . 
13To justify (29d) on the basis of (6) , it helps to have also (29c) and ( 16b) . 
Also, (29ac) and c context (from endnote 9) give (20a) . 
140f the "three processes in natural language interpretation" referred to in the 
title of Fernando (to appear) , translation � is the central process , and must 
(among other things) address the problem of anaphora resolution broached at 
the end of § 2 . 1  above. 
15Section 3 is all about the pressures to express (41c) instead through (Qz : 
(::Ix : U ) a nt (x) ) bite (lz) . Handier notations are,  of course, available. For user­
friendly co-indexing, DRT boxes and diamonds are hard to beat .  But the user 
unafraid of proof terms may wish to try out the inferential scope l, r and the 
A-calculus afford . Fernando (to appear) develops the theory of presupposition 
with that in mind. 
161 have opted for the labels 'wff' and 'gqd' rather than 'proposition ' and 'set ' 
to recognize the formal character of the notions at stake, which are understood 
to be relativized to a relational signature L ( §2 .2 ) . 
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